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A ndrew Bacevich, a regular and perceptivecontributor to Commonweal, has called Rein-hold Niebuhr's The Irony of American Histo-ry "the most important book ever written on
U.S. foreign policy." I suspect he is right. The works of
George Kennan, Averell Harriman, John Foster Dulles,
Henry Kissinger, and George Shultz certainly hold po-
litical and historical interest, and I'm guessing that the
writings of former Secretaries of State Madeleine Albright
and Colin Powell will also continue to earn the attention
of scholars—at least for a while. But while most works of
former foreign-policy heavyweights diminish in signif-
icance over time. The Irony of American History remains
as important today as it was when published in 1952.
To the extent that Niebuhr's book addresses the urgent
moral conundrums of the Cold War, especially the nu-
clear standoff between the United States and the Soviet
Union, it is dated. Yet The Irony of American History also
looks at the conduct of U.S. foreign policy from a theo-
logical and historical perspective, one that takes human
fallibility and its social consequences as inescapable real-
ities. Events today continue to show that we ignore these
realities at great risk—especially when thinking about the
relations between nations.
"All men," Niebuhr wrote in Irony, "are naturally inclined
to obscure the morally ambiguous element in their political
cause by investing it with religious sanctity." In this regard,
his work shines a klieg light on the past decade's so-called
war on terror and the current debate over the operations
of our "national security state." Beginning in the months
after 9/11, President George W. Bush used religious and
apocalyptic images to frame the U.S. response to Al Qae-
da's devastating attacks. Subsequently, high officials at the
CIA, at the Department of Defense, and in the vice presi-
dent's office oversaw decidedly ungodly programs of "coer-
cive interrogation" at Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo, and "black
sites" around the globe. Bush's successor, Barack Obama,
has vigorously prosecuted the war against Al Qaeda even
while ending U.S. military engagement in Iraq and wind-
ing down the war in Afghanistan. These seeming paradox-
es make Obama an ironic figure of the kind that interested
Niebuhr most—the self-conscious, existential irony of a
man who knows he must act in history while being unable
either to control the outcome or to escape the moral ambi-
guity of his choices.
Niebuhr was very much a man of his turbulent century.
Born into a Midwestern Evangelical Lutheran household
in 1892, just in time to be swept up into the political ide-
alism of the Progressive Era, he served as a young pastor
in Detroit, preaching a fiery Social Gospel and practicing
pacifist ethics. He took courageous public stances against
the Klan and championed the cause of auto workers. In
1928, he moved to New York to take a teaching position at
Union Theological Seminary and joined the Socialist Party of
America. A trip to Germany shook him out of his dogmatic
pacifism. Witnessing the rise of European fascism, he began
to argue that resistance to evil sometimes requires military
force. In 1932 he published Moral Man and Immoral Society,
arguing against the naïve idealism of liberal Protestants and
American progressives (including John Dewey). Moral Man
would come to be seen as a prescient warning about Nazi
ideology and an ethical argument for U.S. intervention in
the European conflict, but Niebuhr's views led to heated
debates with liberal and often isolationist thinkers, including
those writing for the Christian Century, the leading journal
of mainline Protestantism.
After the war and the demise of the Soviet-American
alliance, Niebuhr criticized liberals who downplayed or ig-
nored revelations about Soviet gulags and show trials. To
the irritation of the right, however, he also repudiated the
moral dualism that would neatly separate the evils of the
Soviet regime from the virtues of American democracy.
The red-baiting investigations of the House Un-American
Activities Committee were not as different from Stalin's
show trials as many Americans wanted to think, Niebuhr
cautioned. Moreover, there was no escaping the great moral
irony of the Cold War: that in order to protect the world
and preserve democracy, Americans had built weapons of
mass destruction whose use would devastate life on the
planet. The Irony of American History wrestled with these
paradoxes in an honest and persuasive fashion, helping
Niebuhr form alliances with like-minded liberals. With
Arthur Schlesinger, Eleanor Roosevelt, Walter Reuther,
and others, he founded Americans for Democratic Action
to provide an alternative to both the naïve idealism of the
left and the bellicose chest-thumping (and, later, witch-
hunting) of the right. In the 1960s, he emerged as an out-
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spoken opponent of America's misadventure in Vietnam.
By the time of his death in 1971, Niebuhr had managed
to alienate lots of old friends and allies.
Niebuhr's critique of democratic politics was built on
three observations about human nature. The first was that
we habitually justify our political institutions by cloaking
them in an aura of sanctity. In this regard, he was a per-
sistent critic of American exceptionalism, the profound-
ly Protestant notion that America has been singled out by
God as a uniquely virtuous nation. Second, he held that
despite the illusions of control and destiny political ideol-
ogies foster, history is intractable, its course and direction
ultimately beyond human comprehension. Finally, Niehuhr
argued that American history offers little evidence for ei-
ther a triumphalist or a tragic interpretation, hut rather is
fundamentally ironic in nature.
Exceptionalism has heen a powerful force in American
history, from the first preachers of Plymouth Colony and
the gentlemen deists of Virginia all the way to George W
Bush and his pledge to spread democracy throughout the
world. To the amusement of some and the chagrin of oth-
ers, Americans have persistently imagined themselves as
a special people chosen by God to make a new beginning
for mankind. We like to think that our values are beyond
question and our motives pure. Niebuhr described this at-
titude as "the myth of American innocence," noting that
Americans are often baffled and offended when others
think badly of them, and generally insist that "our soci-
ety is so essentially virtuous that only malice could prompt
criticism of any of our actions." These "pretensions of inno-
cency" are associated with what Niebuhr called the "deep
layer of messianic consciousness" that underlies U.S. for-
eign policy. Americans have often believed that God has
summoned the nation to a special mission in the world.
Niehuhr turns to Augustine to dismantle these messian-
ic pretensions. The sack of Rome forced Augustine to rec-
ognize that the Roman Empire was, in fact, not essential to
God's redemptive plan, and that the meaning and direction
of history lie beyond even mankind's most impressive achieve-
ments. At the height of the Cold War, Niehuhr provocatively
argued that we cannot know whether the great river of histo-
ry flows "inevitably" toward capitalism or collectivism. Both
ideologies, he pointed out, pretend to have captured the ul-
timate meaning of history, promising that we can become
masters of our own destiny. Yet Christian faith calls us to
look on all political ideologies and their seductive simplifl-
cations with skepticism. Human beings lack the humility to
accept the fact that "the whole drama of history is enacted
in a frame of meaning too large for human comprehension
or management," Niebuhr wrote. American exceptionalism,
with its "pretensions of innocency" and its messianic ambi-
tions, is deeply entangled in this human need for an ideol-
ogy of history.
The illusions Americans cherish about the direction of
history and the possibility of managing it make American
history ironic. This is Niebuhr's third great insight, and
the one that helps us interpret the presidencies of Bush
and Obama. Niebuhr uses "irony" in its dramatic sense.
Irony in drama happens when the audience understands
more about what a character on stage is saying or doing
than the character does. Where tragedy brings us to tears
for the greatness of the hero, irony brings out a laugh, and
then a moment of comprehension, for "irony involves comic
absurdities which cease to be altogether absurd when fully
understood." Cervantes makes us laugh at the grandiose
illusions of his "bogus knight," Niehuhr notes, but "we
flnally find ourselves laughing with a profounder insight
at the bogus character of knighthood itself." America is
Niehuhr's knight-errant.
American history certainly has its fair share of hypocrisy.
Thomas Jefferson, for example, resolutely placed his "sacred
honor" on the truth that all men are created equal—while
running a feudal manor based on slave labor. But Jefferson's
irony can be seen in his dream of America as a nation of
self-reliant yeomen. American history, it turns out, had a
different plan. We became an urbanized nation of factories
and corporations. In the nineteenth century, America's di-
vinely appointed role in the world had hecome clear to all:
the inexorable course of history was calling us to spread the
heneflts of civilization across the continent and eventually
into the Pacific. But these firmly held convictions about
the innocence of our motives, the purity of our virtues, and
the divine sanction of our manifest destiny led to a geno-
cide against indigenous peoples and the colonization of the
Hawaiian and Philippine Islands. There is a similar irony
in American rhetoric extolling the self-reliant individual,
laissez-faire economics, and minimalist government. In fact,
throughout American history, the rich have manipulated
government to make it serve their own interests.
G eorge W Bush was nothing if not fluent in thelanguage of American exceptionalism. He spokeit with genuine piety and a certainty that wasunnerving to some and an inspiration to others.
His speeches touched on all the great themes. Americans,
he said more than once, are "guided hy a power larger than
ourselves" and have "a calling from beyond the stars to stand
for freedom." Again and again, he insisted, we have heen
a "friend and liberator" of the world, a "power that went
into the world to protect hut not possess, to defend hut not
to conquer." At West Point in 2002 he said, "We are in a
conflict between good and evil." Increasingly his rhetoric
disclosed a stark moral dualism. Terrorists represented "pure
evil"—an evil beyond comprehension—and the mission of
America was to destroy it for the sake of the world. Nor did
Bush entertain doubt about the ineluctable course of his-
tory. "Liberty is the direction of history," he proclaimed—a
history written, moreover, hy an "Author who fills time and
eternity with His purpose." "Evil is real," Bush insisted, but
the purpose of history's Author is that "good will prevail
-¡s
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against it." And America was the agent of the good that
would ultimately prevail.
What Niebuhr would have seen in this attitude is not
hypocrisy but irony. The sincerity of President Bush's faith
in American exceptionalism is beyond reproach; in fact.
Bush is ironic because o/'his sincerity. He truly believed in
America as a "power that went into the world to protect but
not possess, to defend but not to conquer." But the realities
of postcolonial dictators and
the global oil system have
made our foreign policy far
more complicated—and
morally ambiguous—than
the rhetoric of American in-
nocence can tolerate. Niebuhr
could have had Bush in mind
when he discerned great irony
in the fact that "we do not
think of ourselves as the po-
tential masters, but as tutors
of mankind in its pilgrimage
to perfection." It's worth not-
ing that this ironic point of
view does not prevail in this
country; even today, ques-
tioning American motives
behind the debacle of Iraq
invites criticism for "blam-
ing America again."
Seen through the lens
of Niebuhr's ideas. Bush's
confidence that God has
called the nation to a messi-
anic mission in the world and
that America stands at the
vanguard of history clearly
prevented the president—or
protected him—from recog-
nizing that history cannot
be managed. Indeed, both
Bush and Osama bin Laden
believed that, with God on
their side, they could remake
the Middle East; and his-
tory has proven both wrong.
During the arms race of the
1950s, Niebuhr wrote that,
ironically, America was "less potent to do what it wants in
the hour of its greatest strength than it was in its infancy."
The same can be said of America today. The exercise of our
immense economic and military power since World War II
has led to the erosion of our security and now, in the midst
of a war on terror, the abridgement of our rights. "The re-
calcitrant forces in the historical drama," Niebuhr wrote in
1952, "have a power and persistence beyond our reckoning."
SPRINGTIME IN CHICAGO
IN NOVEMBER
Springtime in Chicago in November.
My forty-first year to heaven.
My left hand wants to know
what my right hand is doing.
Oh. Sorry I asked.
First comes love, which I disparage.
I blight with plagues a baby-carriage.
Green means go and red means red.
Now we're cooking with Sudafed.
Steer by, deerfly. I hereby declare
the deer tick on my derrière
a heretic. Derelict, hunker down.
Get the Led out, Goodman Brown.
Get thee behind me, Nathan.
Horseman, ramble on.
Springtime snows white hairs on me.
Green means go and go means gone.
—Michael Robbins
Michael Robbins is the author of the poetry
collections Alien vs. Predator (Penguin,
2012) and The Second Sex (Penguin,
forthcoming). He's at work on a collection
of criticism, Equipment for Living,
forthcoming from Simon Uf Schuster.
Bush's ironies are rooted in the illusions of his belief in
American exceptionalism. Barack Obama's ironies are of a
different nature: they are the ironies of a man who is unable
to believe these illusions. Perhaps the fact that he has read
The Irony of American History contributes to this inability.
In a widely discussed interview with David Brooks during
Obama's first campaign for president. Senator Obama was
asked what he had learned from Niebuhr. The candidate
replied that Niebuhr offers
the "compelling idea" that
"there's serious evil in the
world," and that "we should
be humble and modest in our
belief that we can eliminate
[it]." We must make efforts
to do so, but without "swing-
ing from naïve idealism to
bitter realism."
This synopsis shows a
clear affinity with Niebuhr.
Yet Obama's lack of faith
in American innocence
brings us only halfway to
understanding the irony of
his own position and ac-
tions. Obama understands
that no ideology, including
American exceptionalism,
lets us know the course of
history in advance, and no
policy can succeed at manag-
ing that course. At last year's
National Prayer Breakfast,
he observed that "While
God may reveal his plan to
us in portions, the expanse
of his plan is for God and
God alone to understand."
Obama's irony is the ines-
capable irony of a man who
knows he does not know
enough to overcome the
"moral ambiguities" of his
policies, but who must act all
the same, even when his ac-
tions violate his stated prin-
ciples. The candidate who
vowed to close Guantánamo and give prisoners due process
in federal courts has been prevented from doing so by for-
midable political resistance. The senator who voted against
the war in Iraq became the president who believed he was
required by circumstances to order a significant escalation
of that same war. The president who, in a historic address
to Muslims in Cairo, promised that America would defend
itself while remaining "respectful of the sovereignty of na-
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tions and the rule of law" is the president who has decided
we must infuriate Pakistanis with drone strikes that cause
the death of innocents. These ironies are bitter. Addressing
the Turkish Parliament in 2009, Obama said that "human
endeavor is by its nature imperfect." Niebuhr would have
nodded in agreement and added that this imperfection
does not excuse us from taking action in history. Moreover,
Niebuhr realized that our inability to manage history makes
acting in history inevitably ironic.
Niebuhr would have had no difficulty recognizing Presi-
dent Bush's irony; indeed, he spent a good deal of his life
pointing out the illusions Americans harbor in order to
protect themselves from the moral ambiguity of their actions.
But I think Niebuhr would have recognized Obama's irony as
his own irony, the one that fit his sense of his own personal
predicament. In his life, Niebuhr moved from progressivism
and the Social Gospel to pacifism and socialism. Then an
encounter with evil in Germany forced him to reevaluate
his past and mount a strident criticism of the idealism of
his former friends. In the process he came to believe that
ideologies—whether American exceptionalism or Marxist-
Leninism—are primarily lies we embrace in order to protect
ourselves from the burden of having to act in the face of
history and its unmanageable outcomes. In the end, Niebuhr
did not allow himself the luxury of an illusion. He acted in
history knowing that he did not understand its course and
could not control its outcome.
In light of these ideas it is worth asking, how mightNiebuhr advise the president on the use of drones?Would Niebuhr view terrorism with the same moralurgency he expressed over the rise of National So-
cialism in Germany in the 1930s? Or would he condemn
the use of drones as he did the bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki? Chasing such hypotheticals can be a fool's er-
rand, but I think Niebuhr would have supported Obama's
use of drones. In May the president gave a major policy
address on this topic, and Niebuhr would have found much
to admire in it. The speech made clear that Obama has
considered every tactic, weighing the alternatives and doing
the dreadful moral calculus such a weighing requires. He is
well aware that, even after taking all precautions—which
he outlined at great length—a president ordering the use of
drones may well end up destroying innocent lives. And yet,
he reminded us, "doing nothing is not an option." I believe
Niebuhr would recognize the moral ambiguity of Obama's
situation and the inevitable ironies of acting or failing to
act. But Niebuhr surely would also have much to say about
the danger of Obama's drone policy, especially about the
remoteness such weapons afford us, and about the illusion
that there is a technological escape from the moral realities
of raining hellfire down from heaven on our enemies.
To dismiss Niebuhr as inconsistent or merely pragmatic,
as some have done, is to miss both the point and the power
of the moral scrutiny he applied to the dilemmas of political
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action. Today, though Islamic extremism has replaced Soviet
communism in the minds of many as the principal threat
to Western democracy, the need to recognize the moral
ambiguities of our cause has not abated. To one degree or
another, Niebuhr's insights will continue to be ignored—
since we usually do not want to hear much about either
our limitations or the unavoidably tragic dimensions of the
decisions made in our name. It is my contention, however,
that we are being led by a president who understands these
dimensions. In Barack Obama's second inaugural address,
the rhetoric of hope and renewal that filled his first inau-
gural was notably absent. In its place he stated a difficult
truth. "We must act," the president reminded us. "We must
act knowing that our work will be imperfect. We must act
knowing that today's victories will be only partial." Reinhold
Niebuhr could have written those words—about himself
and his life, and about his country. •
James L. Fredericks teaches in the theology department of
Loyola Marymount University.
Andrew J. Bacevich
O
U
A S a source of insight into the wellsprings ofU.S. foreign policy. Reinhold Niebuhr's TheIrony of American History is an invaluable text. Ifyou want to understand the ambitions, claims,
and conceits animating the United States during its rise to
power and still lingering today, then Niebubr's your man
and Irony the place to look.
As a policy handbook, however. Irony is all but devoid
of value. When it comes to concrete and immediate con-
cerns—dealing with Iran's nuclear ambitions, winding down
the Afghanistan War, or preventing another bout of North
Korean bad behavior, for example—Niebuhr's not much help.
To the statesman beset with problems, Niebuhr may offer
warnings, but he provides little by way of actionable guid-
ance. At best, Niebuhr's counsel serves as the equivalent
of a flashing yellow traffic light at a busy intersection. Go,
says the light, but proceed very, very carefully. As to the
really crucial judgments—Go when? How fast? How far?
In which direction?—well, you're on your own.
The statesman who heeds Niebuhr may avoid a certain
category of egregious mistakes. When reaching the intersec-
tion, he'll at least pause and look both ways before bitting
the accelerator. But heeding Niebuhr won't guarantee sound
decisions or wise policies.
Barack Obama offers a case in point. Obama may well
possess a Niebuhrean temperament, but the president has yet
to demonstrate any particular aptitude for crafting foreign
policy. To be sure, he has avoided the reckless misjudgments
of his pedal-to-the-metal predecessor. For this, all Ameri-
cans should be grateful. Yet as a basis for evaluating states-
Reinhold Niebuhr
manship, better-than-Bush can hardly suffice. In rankings
where the Franklin Roosevelt of 1940-45 (not the FDR of
1933—39) represents the gold standard, Obama languishes
as an also-ran. A notch or two above, say, Lyndon Johnson,
he trails well behind Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower,
and even Richard Nixon.
As Niebuhr himself recognized, international politics is a
competition for power, the possession of power translating
(however imperfectly) into security, prosperity, and the abil-
ity to influence. Here, according to the tenets of Christian
realism, are the criteria by which citizens should—and
history will—judge Obama's performance as a statesman.
Relative to that standard, the president's performance has
been indifferent at best. Granted, like Nixon in 1969, he
inherited a weak hand. But unlike Nixon, whose opening
to China had transformative strategic implications, Obama
has demonstrated little by way of vision and almost none of
the dexterity required to translate vision into reality.
What distinguishes Obama's major foreign-policy initia-
tives—examples include the "reset" of U.S.-Russian relations,
the "pivot to Asia," and above all the "new beginning between
the United States and Muslims around the world" promised
in Cairo—is how little they have yielded in substantive terms.
To quote Walter Móndale, "Where's the beef?"
The president's principal foreign-policy successes have
been negative ones: deferring war with Iran; avoiding war
with North Korea; endorsing the American public's strong
desire to quit and then forget Iraq; and reframing the Af-
ghanistan War so that the United States can depart without
having to admit failure. Note that none of these successes
qualifies as conclusive.
Reinhold Niebuhr would have little difficulty in explain-
ing why Obama's record of achievement is so thin. Despite
all the media-stoked hoopla surrounding his ascent to the
